Watch on the West
A Newsletter of FPRI’s Center for the Study of America and the West

Oh Non! What’s Behind the French Vote, and What’s Ahead?

By Timothy P.R. Weaver

Volume 6, Number 3
June 2005

Timothy Weaver is a research assistant at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He received his M.A. in political science from the University of Pennsylvania and B.A. from St. John’s College, University of Durham (England).

The problem with referenda is that voters rarely address the question asked. Thus the French vote should be seen as less an assessment of the treaty itself than a protest against the loss of French economic and political power and influence within the EU, compounded by anxiety over the effects of globalization on the cherished “French model.” The French vote was thus only tangentially related to the specific issue at hand, but nevertheless fundamentally connected to a larger question: whither the EU?

The Dutch have now joined the French in rejecting the treaty, placing it in mortal peril. The decision of the British government indefinitely to postpone its referendum, in response to events across the Channel, renders the document virtually dead. Despite the hopes of Euroskeptics, however, this is not so of the EU. It will lumber on, as it is in the interest of the member states for it to endure. The challenge, however, will be to reform it economically and politically in order to make the EU truly competitive in the globalized world, and to function with the support of its citizens. This Euroskeptic moment represents a huge challenge, but also an opportunity to fix a somewhat dysfunctional, although not broken, EU.

The Question Itself

To be sure, there were some voters who actually did read the treaty and voted on the basis of their assessment of the relative merits of the document. They, however, are a minority. It is unlikely that the average French voter waded through the 191-page document, let alone understood it. For those who did have a copy on their bedside table, its sole purpose would have been to combat insomnia.

Exit polling produced by the CSA polling organization showed that the treaty itself was only one of many factors for voters. Others included the performance of Chirac’s government, the state of the French economy, fear of Anglo- Saxon “ultra-liberalism,” concern about Turkey’s possible entry into the EU, and the remote and elitist nature of the EU in general. A majority of French voters wanted to register their dissatisfaction on one or more of these points. As Olivier Duhamel, a constitutional expert and political analyst, put it, “voters were in the mood to say: ’the answer is “No,” what is the question?’”

A Tale of Two Crises

The French plebiscite came at a moment of economic and political crisis within the Fifth Republic that is also being felt across continental Western Europe. The economic crisis particularly resides in the failure of the erstwhile economic powerhouses, France and Germany, to make the reforms necessary to promote robust growth and obviate crippling unemployment. The problem is especially acute in France, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 10 percent, and twice as high for people aged 18 to 25. Moreover, the growth rate for the last quarter was a smaller-than-expected 0.2 percent. Crucially, France’s low growth and high unemployment are structural, rather than temporary, conditions of the French economy and, therefore, fundamentally related to France’s inability or unwillingness to change.

Given France’s political culture, and Chirac’s insipid leadership, any attempts by the French government to create jobs will need to come through increased public spending, rather than through reform. However, France is, in theory at least, encumbered by the European budget deficit limit of 3 percent. This rule, to which France is a signatory, has, however, been broken by Paris (and others, notably Berlin) on numerous occasions and will no doubt be broken again presently. However, with France’s real and perceived power relatively weakened through the EU’s enlargement, it will be less able to set the rules of the economic game, and even less able to break them. Voters evidently fear that France would not be able to protect itself from the pressures of globalization in an EU that it no longer controls.

During the referendum campaign, France’s economic anxiety was exploited by those seeking to defeat the treaty, who labeled it “ultraliberal.” The EU was portrayed as being the problem, not the solution. Critics argued that further expansion and liberalization would endanger French jobs and the French welfare state. Thus, workers (and the unemployed) feared that a more flexible labor market, in an expanded EU, would lead to a further period of anemic growth and high unemployment. Extremists on the right and the left preyed upon these fears and, striking nationalist and protectionist chords, warned against the threat to French jobs posed by the “Polish plumber” and the Turkish immigrant. Thus, the legitimate anxiety among many who fear that their jobs are less secure in the global economy was exploited by those who wished to scupper the EU’s progress. Predictably, President Chirac was loath to point out that chronic unemployment is the fault of the French government, not the EU.

France’s political crisis refers to a similar relative decline in power in the political realm that means France is no longer in control of the EU’s direction and destiny. For all their talk of multilateralism, the French want to maintain their hegemony within the EU, or at least remain the other pole in a bipolar, German-French dominated system. Yet the direction of the EU and world undermines this desire. Not only does EU expansion mean a relative loss in political power in terms of numbers, but it also means a waning ideological influence.

Many of the EU’s newest members have a fundamentally different view of economics and international relations than France. The states of Central and Eastern Europe, in the main, favor lower taxes, less regulation and, importantly, an Atlanticist foreign policy. They are far happier with American hegemony at the international level and decry a multipolar vision of international relations, with France at the head of the poles. They know that their economic and existential security will not be ensured by following France. Moreover, the former eastern bloc states are increasingly concerned about an ever more authoritarian and meddling Russia. They know, in this respect, that NATO, not the EU--and especially not France--is key to guaranteeing security against their erstwhile perennial foes, whether Germany or Russia. Thus, for “new Europe,” maintaining good relations with the United States is a central plank of their foreign policy strategy. Supporting a French-led, antagonistic stance vis-.-vis the U.S. is simply anathema to their interests.

Thus, the pain of France’s economic woes is magnified by fear about loss of political power in an expanded and more market-oriented EU. An expanded and expanding EU is no longer one in which French interests generally win out. What’s good for France is no longer what’s good for the EU and, according to some in France, vice-versa. This divergence of interests has been reflected by President Chirac who declared, in response to the referendum defeat, that his government will focus on France’s “national interest.” The EU is now for the first time seen as potentially inimical to that national interest.

Cometh the Hour . .

Ironically, French abandonment of the EU constitution may afford a unique opportunity for another big European state full of Euroskeptics, namely Tony Blair’s Britain. Blair believes in Europe, the EU, and in the euro. He has not been able to take the UK into the euro because of its stubbornly Euroskeptic political culture, fueled to a great degree by a rightwing and rabidly anti-European and press, and because of powerful Euroskeptics within his own party. Mr. Blair is even a fan of the constitutional treaty, which in fact was dubbed “too Anglo-Saxon” by the French). All of this notwithstanding, part of him must be privately pleased with the French vote. This is for two reasons.

First, the French and Dutch votes have provided Mr. Blair with the opportunity to shelve plans to hold the British referendum, which the prime minister had only reluctantly agreed hold in the first place. This will have delighted the Prime minister. The British aversion to “Europe,” especially to the much maligned Brussels bureaucrats, means the referendum would probably have been lost. Since Blair would have been staking his political career on the referendum’s success, this outcome would have precipitated an unedifying and undignified end to his premiership. His hopes of choosing the timing and circumstances of his departure would thus be in tatters. The French and the Dutch, however, have saved him this ordeal, no doubt much to President Chirac’s chagrin.

The second, and more important, reason for Mr. Blair’s presumed pleasure is that the French “non” might enable him to fulfill an elusive mission: to take a lead in Europe, reconciling Britain’s relationship with it, while simultaneously maintaining the Anglo-American special relationship. Just as Chancellor Schroeder’s anti-American rhetoric alienated him from President Bush propelling, Blair to No. 1 U.S. ally status, Chirac has presented Blair with an opportunity to reestablish his European credentials. Crucially, Mr. Blair is well poised to perform this function. On July 1, the UK assumes the rotating six-month presidency of the EU, and it will fall to Blair to craft a forward strategy. Blair’s experience of reforming the British Labour Party will stand him in good stead, for many of the arguments he used to justify reform of his own party are apt for the dysfunctional French, German and Italian economies. To his own party, Mr. Blair argued that in order for Labour to become again electable and to serve the people they purported to represent, they had to accept aspects of the free market, which need not be mutually exclusive with achieving the center-left’s goals: well funded public services, social justice, and opportunity for all. To achieve these goals required low unemployment and robust growth. Only through an embrace of capitalist means could social democratic ends be realized.

Blair makes a similar case for Europe. France and Holland see the liberalizing Lisbon Agenda that the EU created in 2000 as very Blair, and have painted it as antithetical to a social Europe. However, the prime minister demurs. As shown by his premiership in the UK, he is not hell bent on promoting the free market per se. Rather, he is worried that the unholy alliance of old-fashioned statists of the left and pernicious nationalists and protectionists on the right, which secured the no vote in France, will undermine the prospect of a Europe able to compete on the global stage. Taking a break from his Tuscan holiday, Mr. Blair said in the aftermath of the French decision: “The question that is being debated by the people of Europe is how do you, in this era of globalization, make our economies strong and competitive?” He has long opined that in the globalized, information era, working people are not well served by French-style regulation, protectionism, and overly generous welfare states. Even before the French no, Blair planned to use Britain’s presidency of the EU to promote economic reform. Now, the stakes in this effort are heightened, making the coming months a battle for the heart of Europe. Victory on setting the future direction of Europe would give the prime minister the legacy he so covets.

Where Next?

The constitutional treaty cannot come into effect unless it is ratified by all 25 EU members. It is possible, although highly unlikely, that the French and the Dutch may be asked to reconsider and vote again. Further, the British decision to put off their referendum still leaves open the possibility of revisiting the question down the line. However, the most plausible outcome is that there will be no constitution. The next decision point will be the meeting of the European Council on June 16-17, at which the leaders of the EU countries will consider whether or not the ratification process should continue. Most likely, the Council will perform the last rites and pronounce the treaty dead. It is, however, up to the Council to come up with a plan B—apparently there isn’t one This may have to wait, therefore, until July 1, when the British assume the EU presidency.

Tony Blair will not be able to solve all the EU’s problems in six months. Nor will he be able to persuade an anti- market French public suddenly to embrace it. Clearly, he faces many obstacles and difficulties. Most importantly, the constitutional convention was initially established in order to address the problem of an EU of 25 members operating under a system originally designed for 12 or 15. This issue still needs to be addressed even if the treaty is off the table, but any attempts to agree to new rules or pass a mini-treaty without the consent of the people may smack of the very elitism that the French and Dutch sought to punish. Attempts to pass other elements of the treaty in piecemeal fashion may provoke a similar backlash. Furthermore, the prospects of EU enlargement beyond Romania and Bulgaria now look bleak. This means that Turkey may have to wait indefinitely. This is a great shame, since it will be a setback for Turkish reformists and will be taken as a victory for nationalist and anti-immigrant elements within the EU. Moreover, it will make it more difficult for those countries within the EU which are growing economically, and getting older demographically, to get the cheap labor they require. The actual effect of the treaty’s demise on Turkey’s chances will not be seen until October, when accession talks resume; but there is little reason to be optimistic.

It is not, however, all doom and gloom; especially not in Downing Street. Blair may be able to forge a new consensus around making the EU more workable in its enlarged state. More ambitiously, he may provide clear and articulate leadership in favor of the reform agenda. He is well placed to do this, since the French and German powerhouses are clapped out. The same can be said for their leaders. This is good news for Mr. Blair. Before long, he, or at least his vision, is likely to be in more hospitable company. Within the next 18 months, France and Germany are likely to be led respectively by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, both of whom advocate an economically reformed EU. If Mr. Blair can survive his own domestic assassins until then, a grand coalition could be formed.

Blair needs his own coalition of the willing. A sanctimonious, preachy Blair will alienate and antagonize. The temptation for Blair will be to exact revenge on Chirac, whom he holds responsible for scuppering the possibility of a second UN resolution over Iraq in 2003. However, he needs instead to employ the full range of diplomatic skills to quietly garner support for his vision of a modern, dynamic and competitive Europe. With the support of potential reformers such as Sarkozy and Merkel, Mr. Blair’s recipe for success will not be taken as a British plot to Atlanticize Europe.

Conclusion

Underlying the French “non” and the Dutch “nee” was an anxiety and fear about a loss of control. Global markets, faceless bureaucrats, and new EU members all undermine the ability of such peoples from controlling their own destiny within the EU or in the world at large. This anguish comes at a time of economic hardship, when jobs are few and growth is absent. The temptation in these difficult times is to retreat, raise the drawbridge and say “no more.” No more globalization, no more Brussels, and no more EU members! This temptation was exploited by extremists and inadequately countered by leaders, particularly President Chirac, who now has pledged a less European, more nationalistic direction for France.

French withdrawal from the world stage or from the EU, however, will not address the economic crisis that has provided the backdrop to recent debates. Reform is needed in order to produce the growth required to help prevent Europe from languishing behind the U.S., China, and South Asia. The political crisis, though, is more fundamental. France is no longer a global power, and no longer able to control the EU. The expanded EU, on which there is no going back, makes this a new reality with which France with have to reconcile itself.

As for the EU, the rejection of the constitutional treaty provides a number of difficult issues with which it must deal. While the EU is not in peril, a forward strategy must nevertheless be articulated. With the Franco-German motor spluttering, the man left to provide a new vision and demonstrate much needed leadership is Tony Blair, who can use Britain’s presidency of the EU as a platform from which to forge a new consensus. However, he will not be able to do it alone. His challenge will be to recruit fellow generals in this battle. They may come from France and Germany. It would be one of history’s better ironies, if the British, so long aloof from the European experiment, were now to rescue it.

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